Will Khan foster or hinder franchising?: An economic analysis of maximum resale price maintenance

被引：15

作者：

Blair, RD ^{[1
]}

Lafontaine, F

机构：

[1] Univ Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA

[2] Univ Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC POLICY & MARKETING | 1999年 / 18卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1177/074391569901800105

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this article, the authors consider the economic consequences of State Oil v. Khan (1997) for franchising. After discussing the evolution of antitrust policy regarding maximum resale prices, they examine the economics behind franchisors' desire to impose price ceilings on franchisees. The authors show that the most likely explanations for this practice imply that maximum resale prices enhance consumer welfare.

引用

页码：25 / 36

页数：12

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