The effects of envy on reciprocation in a social dilemma

This article presents two studies that address Axelrod's (1984) prescription to not worry about the outcomes that others receive in a mixed-motive situation. The first stud,; demonstrated that people do attend and react to others' outcomes, with people whose outcomes were of a lesser magnitude than the opponent being uncooperative and people with greater-magnitude outcomes being very cooperative. This was true even though own and other outcomes were linearly equivalent. The second study showed that dispositional envy can predict rate of cooperation and that referent cognitions theory can be applied to help alleviate the impact of differing outcomes, both by making amends for small-magnitude outcomes at the end of the game (amelioration) and by providing a reasonable explanation for why the differences in outcomes exist (justification), although the former intervention was ineffective with people with high levels of dispositional envy. Discussion focuses on the role of mental simulations in the reduction of envy effects.