Career concerns, contracts, and effort distortions

被引：13

作者：

Andersson, F ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Lund Univ, S-22100 Lund, Sweden

来源：

JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS | 2002年 / 20卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/323931

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A two-period, career-concerns model with symmetric information but uncertainty about each worker's ability is analyzed. Contracts are unobservable, but incomes are observable. It is shown that effort is distorted upward by contracts being unobservable and that the distortion depends positively on turnover.

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页码：42 / 58

页数：17

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