Territorial competition and the predictability of collective (in)action

Increasing European integration, together with unemployment and the rise of producer services, has provided a notable spur to the growth of economic strategies aimed at boosting the competitive position of particular territorial economies - a phenomenon previously more evident in North America than in Europe. Even where, as in the leading European regions, the challenge is strongest it cannot be assumed, however, that the necessary political organization and commitment will always be available to generate a substantial and coherent competitive response. The aim of this paper is to identify the political and economic conditions making such responses more or less likely. Building on Olson's Logic of collective action, the organizational requirements for territorial competition (viewed as the provision of-a quasi-public good) are analysed in relation to patterns of material interest, leadership potential and institutional constraints. A series of hypotheses are derived as to the circumstances favouring competitive action/inaction, and its strategic/tactical nature. These hypotheses are then examined empirically, with particular reference to initiatives in an extended version of the London region, where action remains localized, fragmented, and/or symbolic in character, despite an increasing perception of the need for a stronger competitive position. In part this situation is attributed to the historically weak development of local economic organizations and regional institutions in England, but in part also to factors which may be shared with other leading metropolitan regions.