Coordinating regime switches

被引：50

作者：

Chamley, C ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Brown Univ, Providence, RI 02912 USA

[2] EHESS, Paris, France

来源：

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1999年 / 114卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1162/003355399556160

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The canonical model of strategic complementarities between individual actions, which exhibits multiple equilibria under perfect information, is extended with heterogeneous agents and imperfect information. Agents observe their own cost of action and the history of the levels of aggregate activity. The distribution of individual characteristics evolves through a random process, and individuals are rational Bayesians. Under plausible conditions, there is a unique equilibrium with phases of high and low activity and random switches. Applications may be found in macroeconomics and revolutions.

引用

页码：869 / 905

页数：37

共 21 条

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