Accounting conservatism and corporate governance

被引:332
作者
Garcia Lara, Juan Manuel [2 ]
Garcia Osma, Beatriz [3 ]
Penalva, Fernando [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Navarra, IESE Business Sch, Barcelona 08034, Spain
[2] Univ Carlos III Madrid, Dept Business Adm, Madrid 28903, Spain
[3] Univ Autonoma Madrid, Dept Accounting, E-28049 Madrid, Spain
关键词
Conditional conservatism; Corporate governance; Managerial discretion; FREE CASH FLOW; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES; DIRECTOR CHARACTERISTICS; ASYMMETRIC TIMELINESS; AGENCY COSTS; BOARD; FIRM; PERFORMANCE; EQUITY;
D O I
10.1007/s11142-007-9060-1
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We predict that firms with stronger corporate governance will exhibit a higher degree of accounting conservatism. Governance level is assessed using a composite measure that incorporates several internal and external characteristics. Consistent with our prediction, strong governance firms show significantly higher levels of conditional accounting conservatism. Our tests take into account the endogenous nature of corporate governance, and the results are robust to the use of several measures of conservatism (market-based and nonmarket-based). Our evidence is consistent with the direction of causality flowing from governance to conservatism, and not vice versa, indicating that governance and conservatism are not substitutes. Finally, we study the impact of earnings discretion on the sensitivity of earnings to bad news across governance structures. We find that, on average, strong-governance firms appear to use discretionary accruals to inform investors about bad news in a timelier manner.
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页码:161 / 201
页数:41
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