Job rotation as a learning mechanism

被引:129
作者
Ortega, J [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Carlos III Madrid, Dept Business Adm, Madrid 28903, Spain
关键词
job rotation; learning;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.47.10.1361.10257
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This article analyzes the costs and benefits of job rotation as a mechanism with which the firm can learn about the employees' productivities and the profitability of different jobs or activities. I compare job rotation to an assignment policy where employees specialize in one job along their career. The gains from adopting a job rotation policy are larger when there is more prior uncertainty about employees and activities. I argue that this firm learning theory fits the existing evidence on rotation better than alternative explanations based on employee motivation and employee learning.
引用
收藏
页码:1361 / 1370
页数:10
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