Fairness and fairness for neighbors: The difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions

被引:37
作者
Beal, Sylvain [1 ]
Remila, Eric [2 ]
Solal, Philippe [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Franche Comte, CRESE, F-25009 Besancon, France
[2] Univ Lyon, LIP, CNRS ENS, UMR 5668, Lyon, France
[3] Univ St Etienne, CNRS, UMR 5824, GATE, St Etienne, France
关键词
Myerson value; Component-wise egalitarian solutions; Fairness; Fairness for neighbors; Two-step value;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.020
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
020101 [政治经济学];
摘要
We replace the axiom of fairness used in the characterization of the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) by fairness for neighbors in order to characterize the component-wise egalitarian solution. When a link is broken, fairness states that the two players incident to the link should be affected similarly while fairness for neighbors states that a player incident to the link and any of his other neighbors should be affected similarly. Fairness for neighbors is also used to characterize the component-wise egalitarian surplus solution and a two-step egalitarian surplus solution. These results highlight that egalitarian and marginalistic allocation rules can be obtained by applying the same equal gain/loss property to different types of players. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:263 / 267
页数:5
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