Exact solution of a modified El Farol's bar problem: Efficiency and the role of market impact

被引:89
作者
Marsili, M
Challet, D
Zecchina, R
机构
[1] INFM, Trieste SISSA Unit, I-34014 Trieste, Italy
[2] Univ Fribourg, Inst Phys Theor, CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland
[3] Abdus Salam Int Ctr Theoret Phys, I-34014 Trieste, Italy
来源
PHYSICA A | 2000年 / 280卷 / 3-4期
关键词
D O I
10.1016/S0378-4371(99)00610-X
中图分类号
O4 [物理学];
学科分类号
0702 ;
摘要
We discuss a model of heterogeneous, inductive rational agents inspired by the El Farol Bar problem and the Minority Game. As in markets, agents interact through a collective aggregate variable - which plays a role similar to price - whose value is fixed by all of them. Agents follow a simple reinforcement-learning dynamics where the reinforcement, for each of their available strategies, is related to the payoff delivered by that strategy. We derive the exact solution of the model in the "thermodynamic" limit of infinitely many agents using tools of statistical physics of disordered systems. Our results show that the impact of agents on the market price plays a key role: even though price has a weak dependence on the behavior of each individual agent, the collective behavior crucially depends on whether agents account for such dependence or not. Remarkably, if the adaptive behavior of agents accounts even "infinitesimally" for this dependence they can, in a whole range of parameters, reduce global fluctuations by a finite amount. Both global efficiency and individual utility improve with respect to a "price taker" behavior if agents account for their market impact. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:522 / 553
页数:32
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