Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials

被引：122

作者：

Budish, Eric ^{[1
]}

Roin, Benjamin N. ^{[2
]}

Williams, Heidi ^{[3
,4
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Chicago, Booth Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA

[2] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

[3] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

[4] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2015年 / 105卷 / 07期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

SURROGATE END-POINTS; DRUG DEVELOPMENT; PATENT; INNOVATION; APPROVAL; SURVIVAL; HEALTH; LIFE; INVESTMENT; AGENCY;

D O I：

10.1257/aer.20131176

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We investigate whether private research investments are distorted away from long-term projects. Our theoretical model highlights two potential sources of this distortion: short-termism and the fixed patent term. Our empirical context is cancer research, where clinical trials-and hence, project durations-are shorter for late-stage cancer treatments relative to early-stage treatments or cancer prevention. Using newly constructed data, we document several sources of evidence that together show private research investments are distorted away from long-term projects. The value of life-years at stake appears large. We analyze three potential policy responses: surrogate (non-mortality) clinical-trial endpoints, targeted R&D subsidies, and patent design. (JEL D92, G31, I11, L65, O31, O34)

引用

页码：2044 / 2085

页数：42

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