An asymptotic solution for sealed bid common-value auctions with bidders having asymmetric information

被引:12
作者
Laskowski, MC [1 ]
Slonim, RL
机构
[1] Univ Maryland, Dept Math, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[2] Case Western Reserve Univ, Weatherhead Sch Management, Dept Econ, Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1006/game.1998.0693
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We investigate a first-price common-value auction where bidders have asymmetric information about an item of unknown value. We compute the unique Nash equilibrium when the bidders are constrained to translation-invariant bid functions. Further, this profile of bid functions is also an asymptotic Nash equilibrium (without the constraint on the bidders' strategies) as the a priori distribution of the true value becomes increasingly diffuse. All bidders have positive expected profits at equilibrium. In the second-price analogue with two bidders there is a continuum of Nash equilibria in which both bidders have positive expected profits. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C7. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:238 / 255
页数:18
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