What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives

被引:244
作者
Brickley, JA
Linck, JS
Coles, JL
机构
[1] Univ Rochester, William E Simon Grad Sch Business, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
[2] Arizona State Univ, Dept Finance, Coll Business, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA
关键词
corporate governance; incentives; horizon problems; career concerns; board service; CEO compensation;
D O I
10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00012-4
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper provides evidence on a previously unidentified source of managerial incentives: concerns about post-retirement board service. Both the likelihood that a retired CEO serves on his own board two years after departure, as well as the likelihood of serving as an outside director on other boards, are positively and strongly related to his performance while CEO. Retention on the CEO's own board depends primarily on stock returns, while service on outside boards is better explained by accounting returns. The evidence also suggests that firms consider ability in choosing board members. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:341 / 377
页数:37
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