Desire-based and value-based normative reasons

被引:11
作者
Savulescu, J [1 ]
机构
[1] Royal Childrens Hosp, Murdoch Inst, Melbourne, Vic, Australia
[2] Univ Melbourne, Ctr Study Hlth & Soc, Parkville, Vic 3052, Australia
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1467-8519.00168
中图分类号
B82 [伦理学(道德学)];
学科分类号
摘要
This paper is a response to John Harris' provocative 'Justice and Equal Opportunities in Health Care: The aim of this short response is to locate the difference between Harris and me within a broader debate about the nature of reasons for action. I argue that Harm's is appealing to a desire-based conception of normative reasons. I highlight some of the deficiencies of a desire-based conception of reasons, and contrast it with a value-based account.
引用
收藏
页码:405 / 413
页数:9
相关论文
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