学术探索
学术期刊
新闻热点
数据分析
智能评审

The historic prisoner's dilemma

被引：9
作者：
Alonso-Sanz, R [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Politecn Madrid, ETSI Agron Estad, E-28040 Madrid, Spain
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BIFURCATION AND CHAOS | 1999年 / 9卷 / 06期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1142/S0218127499000857
中图分类号：
O1 [数学];
学科分类号：
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要：
The effect of considering previous results (history) in the spatial formulation of the Prisoner's Dilemma is assessed. It is concluded that history protects homogeneous populations against the irruption of mutant behavior.
引用
收藏
页码：1197 / 1210
页数：14
相关论文
共 5 条
[1]  
Axelrod R., 1985, EVOLUTION COOPERATIO
[2]   Robustness of cooperation [J].
Mukherji, A ;
Rajan, V ;
Slagle, JR .
NATURE, 1996, 379 (6561) :125-126
[3]   MORE SPATIAL GAMES [J].
NOWAK, MA ;
BONHOEFFER, S ;
MAY, RM .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BIFURCATION AND CHAOS, 1994, 4 (01) :33-56
[4]  
NOWAK MA, 1995, SCI AM, V272, P50
[5]   THE SPATIAL DILEMMAS OF EVOLUTION [J].
Nowak, Martin A. ;
May, Robert M. .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BIFURCATION AND CHAOS, 1993, 3 (01) :35-78
1