The market for deadbeats

被引:31
作者
Brinig, MF
Buckley, FH
机构
关键词
D O I
10.1086/467976
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
This article outlines three explanations for why states seek migrants and tests them by reference to 1985-90 interstate migration flows. On race-for-the-top theories, states compete for value-increasing migrants by offering them healthy economies and efficient laws. On vote-seeking theories, states compete for clienteles of voters, with some states seeking to attract and some to deter welfare- or tax-loving migrants. On deadbeat theories, states compete for high human capital debtors by offering them a fresh start from out-of-state creditors. Our findings support vote-seeking and deadbeat theories.
引用
收藏
页码:201 / 232
页数:32
相关论文
共 75 条
[1]   HOMESTEADING AND PROPERTY-RIGHTS - OR, HOW THE WEST WAS REALLY WON [J].
ALLEN, DW .
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1991, 34 (01) :1-23
[2]  
[Anonymous], CURR POP SURV
[3]  
[Anonymous], INT J CHILDRENS RIGH
[4]  
Aries Philippe., 1962, CENTURIES CHILDHOOD
[5]  
ATTFIELD CLF, 1991, RATIONAL EXPECTATION, P26
[6]  
BAKER P, 1994, WASH POST 0115, pA1
[7]   ARE GOVERNMENT BONDS NET WEALTH [J].
BARRO, RJ .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1974, 82 (06) :1095-1117
[8]  
Bhagwati JagdishN., 1989, INCOME TAXATION INT
[9]  
Borjas G.J., 1990, Friends or strangers: The impact of immigrants on the U.S. economy
[10]  
BRINIG MF, 1993, OHIO ST J DISP RESOL, V8, P279