Social norms and human cooperation

被引:903
作者
Fehr, E [1 ]
Fischbacher, U [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Zurich, Inst Empirical Res Econ, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland
关键词
D O I
10.1016/j.tics.2004.02.007
中图分类号
B84 [心理学]; C [社会科学总论]; Q98 [人类学];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ; 030303 ; 04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
The existence of social norms is one of the big unsolved problems in social cognitive science. Although no other concept is invoked more frequently in the social sciences, we still know little about how social norms are formed, the forces determining their content, and the cognitive and emotional requirements that enable a species to establish and enforce social norms. In recent years, there has been substantial progress, however, on how cooperation norms are enforced. Here we review evidence showing that sanctions are decisive for norm enforcement, and that they are largely driven by non-selfish motives. Moreover, the explicit study of sanctioning behavior provides instruments for measuring social norms and has also led to deeper insights into the proximate and ultimate forces behind human cooperation.
引用
收藏
页码:185 / 190
页数:6
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