Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information

被引：195

作者：

Bolton, Gary ^{[1
,2
]}

Greiner, Ben ^{[3
]}

Ockenfels, Axel ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Penn State Univ, Smeal Coll Business, University Pk, PA 16802 USA

[2] Univ Texas Dallas, Jindal Sch Management, Richardson, TX 75080 USA

[3] Univ New S Wales, Sch Econ, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia

[4] Univ Cologne, Dept Econ, D-50923 Cologne, Germany

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2013年 / 59卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

market design; reputation; trust; reciprocity; eBay; SELLER REPUTATION; EBAY; MARKET; FEEDBACK; AUCTIONS; PRICE; PROVISION; STRANGERS; ECONOMICS; SELECTION;

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.1120.1609

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

Reciprocity in feedback giving distorts the production and content of reputation information in a market, hampering trust and trade efficiency. Guided by feedback patterns observed on eBay and other platforms, we run laboratory experiments to investigate how reciprocity can be managed by changes in the way feedback information flows through the system, leading to more accurate reputation information, more trust, and more efficient trade. We discuss the implications for theory building and for managing the redesign of market trust systems.

引用

页码：265 / 285

页数：21

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