Uncertainty and entry deterrence

被引:30
作者
Maskin, ES [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
entry deterrence; uncertainty; capacity;
D O I
10.1007/s001990050302
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study a model where capacity installation by an incumbent firm serves to deter others from entering the industry. We argue that uncertainty about demand or costs forces the incumbent to choose a higher capacity level than it would under certainty. This higher level diminishes the attractiveness of deterrence (Proposition 1) and, therefore, the range of parameter values for which deterrence occurs (Proposition 2).
引用
收藏
页码:429 / 437
页数:9
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