Cascading contingent protection and vertical market structure

被引:23
作者
Sleuwaegen, L
Belderbos, R
Jie-A-Joen, C
机构
[1] Erasmus Univ, Dept Econ, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands
[2] Catholic Univ Louvain, Dept Appl Econ, B-3000 Louvain, Belgium
[3] Maastricht Univ, Dept Econ & Business Adm, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands
[4] Arthur Andersen & Co, NL-3001 AX Rotterdam, Netherlands
关键词
antidumping; cascading contingent protection; market structure; strategic trade policy;
D O I
10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00048-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Cascading contingent protection may occur when protection of an upstream industry transfers injury to the downstream industry and increases the likelihood that this industry asks and receives protection. This paper examines cascading protection within a sequential petitioning model where the upstream industry acts as leader. The analysis identifies market structure and the vertical linkage between the: upstream and the downstream industry as important determinants of the occurrence of cascading protection. It is shown that the circumstances which make cascading protection more likely to occur also make it more Likely that this protection has serious negative welfare consequences. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:697 / 718
页数:22
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