TWO CONCEPTS OF EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE

被引：75

作者：

Coady, David ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Tasmania, Hobart, Tas 7001, Australia

来源：

EPISTEME-A JOURNAL OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY | 2010年 / 7卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.3366/epi.2010.0001

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

I describe two concepts of epistemic injustice. The first of these concepts is explained through a critique of Alvin Goldman's veritistic social epistemology. The second is closely based on Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice. I argue that there is a tension between these two forms of epistemic injustice and tentatively suggest some ways of resolving the tension.

引用

页码：101 / 113

页数：13

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