Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits

被引：34

作者：

Dobzinski, Shahar ^{[1
]}

Lavi, Ron ^{[3
]}

Nisan, Noam ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Sch Engn & Comp Sci, IL-91905 Jerusalem, Israel

[2] Hebrew Univ & Google Tel Aviv, Sch Engn & Comp Sci, IL-91905 Jerusalem, Israel

[3] IE&M Tech, Bangalore, Karnataka, India

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 49TH ANNUAL IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON FOUNDATIONS OF COMPUTER SCIENCE | 2008年

关键词：

D O I：

10.1109/FOCS.2008.39

中图分类号：

TP301 [理论、方法];

学科分类号：

081202 ;

摘要：

We study multi-unit auctions where the bidders have a budget constraint, a situation very common in practice that has received very little attention in the auction theory literature. Our main result is an impossibility: there are no incentive-compatible auctions that always produce a Pareto-optimal allocation. We also obtain some surprising positive results for certain special cases.

引用

页码：260 / +

页数：2