Integration versus outsourcing in industry equilibrium

被引:424
作者
Grossman, GM [1 ]
Helpman, E
机构
[1] Princeton Univ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Tel Aviv Univ, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1162/003355302753399454
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We develop an equilibrium model of industrial structure in which the organization of firms is endogenous. Differentiated consumer products can be produced either by vertically integrated firms or by pairs of specialized companies. Production of each variety of consumer good requires a specialized component. Vertically integrated firms can manufacture the components they need, but they face a relatively high cost of governance. Specialized firms can produce at lower cost, but search for partners is costly, and input suppliers face a potential holdup problem. We study the determinants of the equilibrium mode of organization when inputs are fully or partially specialized.
引用
收藏
页码:85 / 120
页数:36
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