The irreducible complexity of objectivity

The terms "objectivity" and "objective" are among the most used yet ill-defined terms in the philosophy of science and epistemology. Common to all the various usages is the rhetorical force of " I endorse this and you should too", or to put it more mildly, that one should trust the outcome of the objectivity-producing process. The persuasive endorsement and call to trust provide some conceptual coherence to objectivity, but the reference to objectivity is hopefully not merely an attempt at persuasive endorsement. What, in addition to epistemological endorsement, does objectivity carry with it? Drawing on recent historical and philosophical work, I articulate eight operationally accessible and distinct senses of objectivity. While there are links among these senses, providing cohesion to the concept, I argue that none of the eight senses is strictly reducible to the others, giving objectivity its irreducible complexity.