Economists' models of learning

被引：31

作者：

Sobel, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif San Diego, Dept Econ, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2000年 / 94卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.2000.2701

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Economic theorists have intensively studied learning in games and decisions over the last decade. This essay puts some of the work in perspective and offers opinions about what still needs to be learned. Journal Or Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, D83. (C) 2000 Academic Press.

引用

页码：241 / 261

页数：21

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