Tax competition when governments lack commitment: Excess capacity as a countervailing threat

被引:49
作者
Janeba, E [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Colorado, Dept Econ, Boulder, CO 80309 USA
[2] Indiana Univ, Bloomington, IN USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.90.5.1508
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码:1508 / 1519
页数:12
相关论文
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