Universal service obligations and competition

被引：43

作者：

Choné, P

Flochel, L

Perrot, A

机构：

[1] Univ Paris 01 Pantheon Sorbonne, EUREQua, Paris, France

[2] Univ Evry Val Essonne, EPEE, F-91025 Evry, France

来源：

INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY | 2000年 / 12卷 / 03期

关键词：

universal service obligations; cross-subsidies; regulation; network utilities; equal access;

D O I：

10.1016/S0167-6245(00)00014-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 [经济学];

摘要：

We provide some elements to assess and compare various regulatory rules for the allocation and funding of universal service obligations (USOs). We restrict ourselves to ubiquity and spatial non discrimination constraints. We examine the welfare consequences of two systems: First, a regulation where USOs are imposed only on the incumbent firm (restricted-entry regulation) and second, a 'pay or play' rule where the entrant may serve non profitable users. Whereas pay or play regulation dominates when only the ubiquity constraint is at work, this result no longer holds when non discrimination is added. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：249 / 259

页数：11