Economic game theory for mutualism and cooperation

被引:130
作者
Archetti, Marco [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Scheuring, Istvan [4 ,5 ]
Hoffman, Moshe [6 ]
Frederickson, Megan E. [7 ]
Pierce, Naomi E. [1 ,2 ]
Yu, Douglas W. [8 ,9 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Organism & Evolutionary Biol, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Museum Comparat Zool, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Univ Basel, Dept Econ & Business, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland
[4] Eotvos Lorand Univ, Dept Plant Taxon & Ecol, Res Grp Theoret Biol & Ecol, H-1117 Budapest, Hungary
[5] HAS, H-1117 Budapest, Hungary
[6] Univ Calif San Diego, Rady Sch Management, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
[7] Univ Toronto, Dept Ecol Evolutionary Biol, Toronto, ON M5S 3G5, Canada
[8] Chinese Acad Sci, Kunming Inst Zool, Ecol Conservat & Environm Ctr ECEC, State Key Lab Genet Resources & Evolut, Kunming 650223, Yunnan, Peoples R China
[9] Univ E Anglia, Sch Biol Sci, Norwich NR4 7TJ, Norfolk, England
基金
美国国家科学基金会; 加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会; 英国医学研究理事会;
关键词
Coevolution; common-pool resource; cooperation; game theory; host sanctions; mutualism; N-person prisoner's dilemma; public goods; symbiosis; volunteer's dilemma; PUBLIC-GOODS; REPRODUCTIVE SUCCESS; VOLUNTEERS DILEMMA; COLLECTIVE ACTION; SOCIAL-BEHAVIOR; CONTRACT THEORY; PARTNER CHOICE; HOST SANCTIONS; AUTUMN COLORS; EVOLUTION;
D O I
10.1111/j.1461-0248.2011.01697.x
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
We review recent work at the interface of economic game theory and evolutionary biology that provides new insights into the evolution of partner choice, host sanctions, partner fidelity feedback and public goods. (1) The theory of games with asymmetrical information shows that the right incentives allow hosts to screen-out parasites and screen-in mutualists, explaining successful partner choice in the absence of signalling. Applications range from ant-plants to microbiomes. (2) Contract theory distinguishes two longstanding but weakly differentiated explanations of host response to defectors: host sanctions and partner fidelity feedback. Host traits that selectively punish misbehaving symbionts are parsimoniously interpreted as pre-adaptations. Yucca-moth and legume-rhizobia mutualisms are argued to be examples of partner fidelity feedback. (3) The theory of public goods shows that cooperation in multi-player interactions can evolve in the absence of assortment, in one-shot social dilemmas among non-kin. Applications include alarm calls in vertebrates and exoenzymes in microbes.
引用
收藏
页码:1300 / 1312
页数:13
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