An agent-based system for bilateral contracts of energy

被引:20
作者
Kebriaei, Hamed [1 ]
Rahimi-Kian, Ashkan [2 ]
Majd, Vahid Johari [1 ]
机构
[1] Tarbiat Modares Univ, Intelligent Control Syst Lab, Dept Elect Engn, Tehran, Iran
[2] Univ Tehran, Control & Intelligent Proc Ctr Excellence, Sch ECE, Tehran, Iran
关键词
Bilateral contract; Game theory; Negotiation process; Generating company; Load company; Leader-follower concept; EQUILIBRIUM BIDDING STRATEGIES; ELECTRICITY MARKET; NEGOTIATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.eswa.2011.03.005
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
140502 [人工智能];
摘要
In this paper, an agent-based system for bilateral contracts of energy is proposed. The generating companies submit their offers to the demand companies. The demand companies also submit their bids to the generators. Each load or generator's agent wants to match with an opponent, which offers the most valuable proposal. However, the problem of simultaneous decision-making causes decision conflicts among the agents. To overcome this conflict, we assume loads as the leaders and generators as the followers. We use Stackelberg game to match the seller and buyer agents. The negotiation process between a buyer and its potential seller will determine the power price between them. This process is carried out through a proposed combined time-behavioral protocol (TBP). With negligible changes in around the agreed price, this protocol can reduce the negotiation time considerably. After successful negotiation, the seller and buyer agents could sign a bilateral contract of energy if the market conditions allow it. The applicability of the proposed method is illustrated through a case study. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:11369 / 11376
页数:8
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