The importance of relative performance feedback information: Evidence from a natural experiment using high school students

被引:199
作者
Azmat, Ghazala
Iriberri, Nagore [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Dept Econ & Empresa, Barcelona 08005, Spain
关键词
School performance; Relative performance; Absolute performance; Feedback; Natural experiment; Social comparison; Self-perception; Competitive preferences; PREFERENCES; COMPETITION; EDUCATION; CONTESTS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.04.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the effect of providing relative performance feedback information on performance, when individuals are rewarded according to their absolute performance. A natural experiment that took place in a high school offers an unusual opportunity to test this effect in a real-effort setting. For one year only, students received information that allowed them to know whether they were performing above (below) the class average as well as the distance from this average. We exploit a rich panel dataset and find that the provision of this information led to an increase of 5% in students' grades. Moreover, the effect was significant for the whole distribution. However, once the information was removed, the effect disappeared. To rule out the concern that the effect may be artificially driven by teachers within the school, we verify our results using national level exams (externally graded) for the same students, and the effect remains. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:435 / 452
页数:18
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