Free trade networks with transfers

被引：15

作者：

Furusawa, T ^{[1
]}

Konishi, H

机构：

[1] Hitotsubashi Univ, Kunitachi, Tokyo, Japan

[2] Boston Coll, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167 USA

来源：

JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2005年 / 56卷 / 02期

关键词：

C70; F15;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00324.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We investigate the network of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in the context of a network formation game with transfers. In a previous paper we showed that without international transfers countries with different industrialization levels cannot sign an FTA, so that the global free trade network, in which every pair of countries signs an FTA, is not in general pairwise-stable. In this paper we show that, even if the world consists of fairly asymmetric countries, the global free trade network is pairwise-stable when transfers between FTA signatories are allowed. Moreover, it is a unique pairwise-stable network unless industrial commodities are highly substitutable.

引用

页码：144 / 164

页数：21

共 18 条

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