Why firms adopt antitakeover arrangements

被引：49

作者：

Bebchuk, LA ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Law, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW | 2003年 / 152卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/3313033

中图分类号：

D9 [法律]; DF [法律];

学科分类号：

0301 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：713 / 753

页数：41

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