Takings, compensation and endangered species protection on private lands

被引:89
作者
Innes, R [1 ]
Polasky, S
Tschirhart, J
机构
[1] Univ Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
[2] Oregon State Univ, Corvallis, OR 97331 USA
[3] Univ Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/jep.12.3.35
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Preserving endangered species on private land benefits the public, but may confer cost on landowners if property is 'taken.' Government compensation to landowners can offset costs, although the Endangered Species Act does not require compensation. The authors survey private economic incentives for species preservation created by alternative property rights and compensation regimes. Compensation will effect investments in land and the willingness of landowners to collect and impart information about their land's preservation value. The authors also address government incentives and how deadweight costs of compensation will influence design of property rights, and how government's susceptibility to interest group pressure may cause inefficient preservation.
引用
收藏
页码:35 / 52
页数:18
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