THE EFFECT OF A HISTORY-FITNESS-BASED UPDATING RULE ON EVOLUTIONARY GAMES

In this paper,we introduce a history-fitness-based updating rule into the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on square lattices,and study how it works on the evolution of cooperation level. Under this updating rule, the player i will firstly select player j from its direct neighbors at random and then compare their fitness which is determined by the current payoff and history fitness. If player i's fitness is larger than that of j,player i will be more likely to keep its own strategy. Numerical results show that the cooperation level is remarkably promoted by the history-fitness-based updating rule. Moreover,there exists a moderate mixing proportion of current pay off and history fitness that can induce the optimal fitness, where the highest cooperation level is obtained. Our work may shed some new light on the ubiquitous cooperative behaviors in nature and society induced by the history factor