Repetition and signalling: experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria

被引：32

作者：

Clark, K

Sefton, M ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Newcastle Upon Tyne, Dept Econ, Newcastle Upon Tyne NE1 7RU, Tyne & Wear, England

[2] Univ Manchester, Sch Econ Studies, Manchester, Lancs, England

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2001年 / 70卷 / 03期

关键词：

experimental games; coordination; repetition; signaling;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00381-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 [经济学];

摘要：

We report experiments where subjects generally fail to attain the efficient equilibrium of a one-shot game, but attain the efficient equilibrium of the repeated version. The results suggest that in the repeated game actions are used to signal future intentions. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science BN. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：357 / 362

页数：6

共 9 条

[1]

VIRTUAL IMPLEMENTATION IN ITERATIVELY UNDOMINATED STRATEGIES - COMPLETE INFORMATION [J].