On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union

被引:48
作者
Chari, V. V. [1 ,2 ]
Kehoe, Patrick J. [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
[2] Fed Reserve Bank Minneapolis, Minneapolis, MN 55041 USA
[3] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
free riding problem; growth and stability pact; time inconsistency; international cooperation;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2007.06.032
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on whether the monetary authority can commit to following its policies. If it can commit, then debt constraints can only impose costs. If it cannot commit, then fiscal policy has a free-rider problem, and debt constraints may be desirable. This type of free-rider problem is new and arises only because of a time inconsistency problem. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:2399 / 2408
页数:10
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