Retail electricity competition

被引:66
作者
Joskow, Paul [1 ]
Tirole, Jean
机构
[1] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[2] Univ Toulouse, Toulouse, France
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00058.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We analyze a number of unstudied aspects of retail electricity competition. We first explore the implications of load profiling of consumers whose traditional meters do not permit the measurement of their real-time consumption. The combination of retail competition and load profiling does not yield the second-best prices given the non-price-responsiveness of retail consumers. We then examine the incentives that electricity retailers have to install each of two types of advanced metering equipment. Finally, we consider the implications of physical limitations on the ability of system operators to cut off individual consumers relying instead on "zonal" rationing of large groups of individual consumers
引用
收藏
页码:799 / 815
页数:17
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