Managerial compensation and capital structure

We investigate the interaction between financial structure and managerial compensation and show that risky debt affects both the probability of managerial replacement and the manager's wage if he is retained by the firm. Our model yields a rich set of predictions, including the following: (i) The market values of equity and debt decrease if the manager is replaced; moreover, the expected cash flow of firms that retain their managers exceeds that of firms that replace their managers. (ii) Managers of firms with risky debt outstanding are promised lower severance payments (golden parachutes) than managers of firms that do not have risky debt. (iii) Controlling for firm's size, the leverage, managerial compensation, and cash flow of firms that retain their managers are positively correlated. (iv) Controlling for the firm's size, the probability of managerial turnover and firm value are negatively correlated. (v) Managerial pay-performance sensitivity is positively correlated with leverage, expected compensation, and expected cash flows.