Market (in)attention and the strategic scheduling and timing of earnings announcements

被引:200
作者
deHaan, Ed [1 ]
Shevlin, Terry [2 ]
Thornock, Jacob [3 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Univ Calif Irvine, Merage Sch Business, Irvine, CA 92717 USA
[3] Univ Washington, Foster Sch Business, Seattle, WA 98195 USA
关键词
Market attention; Earnings announcement timing; Earnings announcement scheduling; Earnings announcement notifications; Strategic disclosure; BAD-NEWS; INFORMATION; ATTENTION; COMPENSATION; DISCLOSURES; TIMELINESS; CEOS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.03.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate whether managers "hide" bad news by announcing earnings during periods of low attention, or by providing less forewarning of an upcoming earnings announcement. Our findings are consistent with managers reporting bad news after market hours, on busy days, and with less advance notice, and with earnings receiving less attention in these settings. Paradoxically, our findings indicate that managers also report bad news on Fridays, but we do not find lower attention on Fridays. Further, we find negative returns when the market is notified of an upcoming Friday earnings announcement, which is consistent with investors inferring forthcoming bad news. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:36 / 55
页数:20
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