The economics of advertising and privacy

被引:103
作者
Tucker, Catherine E. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] MIT, MIT Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Privacy; Online advertising; Targeting; REACTANCE; BEHAVIOR; PRICES;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2011.11.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
One of the new realities of advertising is that personal information can be used to ensure that advertising is only shown and designed for a select group of consumers who stand to gain most from this information. However, to gather the data used for targeting requires some degree of privacy intrusion by advertisers. This sets up a tradeoff between the informativeness of advertising and the degree of privacy intrusion. This paper summarizes recent empirical research that illuminates this tradeoff. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:326 / 329
页数:4
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