R&D competition, absorptive capacity, and market shares

被引：15

作者：

Campisi, D

Mancuso, P

Nastasi, A

机构：

[1] Univ Roma Tor Vergata, Dipartimento Informat Sistemi & Prod, I-00133 Rome, Italy

[2] Univ Roma La Sapienza, Dipartimento Informat & Sistemist, I-00185 Rome, Italy

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2001年 / 73卷 / 01期

关键词：

cost-reducing R&D; stock of technological knowledge; extra-industry R&D; dynamic noncooperative feedback game;

D O I：

10.1007/BF02339581

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper deals with an oligopolistic industry where firms are engaged in cost-reducing R&D activity to maximize their market shares. The existence and uniqueness of a feedback-Nash-optimal R&D strategy for each firm are discussed. Our simulations highlight that variations in spillovers hardly influence the firms R&D investment, if their absorptive capacities to exploit extramural knowledge depend on their R&D efforts. Moreover, extramural knowledge cannot completely replace in-house R&D. However, a high level of public R&D favors the firm with the most restrictive R&D expenditure constraint and/or with the lowest initial R&D stock provided it invests in R&D.

引用

页码：57 / 80

页数：24

共 23 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 1995, HDB EC INNOV TECHNOL

[2]

Arrow KJ., 1962, RATE DIRECTION INVEN, P609, DOI [DOI 10.1521/IJGP.2006.56.2.191, 10.1515/9781400879762-024]

[3]

Basar T., 1995, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory

[4]

CALDERINI M, 1998, INT TEL SOC 12 INT C

[5] Cost reduction, competitive pressure and firms' optimal R&D strategies in a duopolistic industry [J].

Campisi, D ;

Mancuso, P ;

Nastasi, A .

REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 1997, 12 (02) :259-270

[6] Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R & D [J].

COHEN, WM ;

LEVINTHAL, DA .

ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1989, 99 (397) :569-596

[7] UNCERTAINTY, INDUSTRIAL-STRUCTURE, AND THE SPEED OF R AND D [J].

DASGUPTA, P ;

STIGLITZ, J .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1980, 11 (01) :1-28

[8]

DASPREMONT C, 1988, AM ECON REV, V78, P1133

[9]

Friedman J.W., 1990, GAME THEORY APPL EC

[10] PREEMPTION, LEAPFROGGING AND COMPETITION IN PATENT RACES [J].

FUDENBERG, D ;

GILBERT, R ;

STIGLITZ, J ;

TIROLE, J .

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1983, 22 (01) :3-31

← 1 2 3 →