A positive theory of social security based on reputation

被引：112

作者：

Cooley, TF ^{[1
]}

Soares, J

机构：

[1] Univ Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627 USA

[2] George Washington Univ, Washington, DC 20052 USA

[3] Portuguese Catholic Univ, Lisbon, Portugal

来源：

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 1999年 / 107卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/250053

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We construct a general equilibrium model in which a pay-as-you-go social security system can be adopted and sustained as a political and economic equilibrium. We analyze the welfare implications of this system and compare general equilibrium welfare measures to the commonly used notion of actuarial fairness.

引用

页码：135 / 160

页数：26

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[3]

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