Adaptive learning versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining

被引:26
作者
Abbink, K [1 ]
Bolton, GE
Sadrieh, A
Tang, FF
机构
[1] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain
[2] CSIC, Inst Anal Econ, Barcelona, Spain
[3] Penn State Univ, Smeal Coll Business, University Pk, PA 16870 USA
[4] Tilburg Univ, Dept Econ, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[5] Nanyang Technol Univ, Nanyang Business Sch, Singapore 639798, Singapore
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1006/game.2000.0837
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Adaptive learning and a fairness motive we call "punishment" are the basis for two prominent and substantially different types of theories of ultimatum bargaining behavior. We compare adaptive learning and fairness in an experiment that involves punishment and reward versions of the ultimatum game. We draw conclusions concerning the abilities and limitations of both types of theories. The results shed light on how learning and fairness interact, information that should be useful in constructing a more comprehensive model. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 25
页数:25
相关论文
共 24 条