Mission impossible!?: On the harmonization of national allocation plans under the EU emissions trading directive

被引:22
作者
Böhringer, C
Lange, A
机构
[1] Univ Heidelberg, Ctr European Econ Res, ZEW, Dept Econ, D-68034 Mannheim, Germany
[2] Univ Maryland, Dept Agr & Resource Econ, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
关键词
emissions trading; allowance allocation; national allocation plan; competitive distortions;
D O I
10.1007/s11149-004-4420-2
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Starting in 2005, the EU will implement a CO(2) emissions trading scheme. We show that the outspoken objectives of economic efficiency and free allocation of allowances are incompatible with harmonized allocation rules. The latter would be necessary to avoid unequal changes of the financial positions between identical firms across the EU, thereby distorting competition, i.e. the "level playing field". We discuss and evaluate potential adjustments to the current prescriptions of the EU emissions trading system in order to achieve harmonization of allowance allocation across EU Member States. The proposed adjustments involve relaxation of either the efficiency objective or the objective of free allowance allocation.
引用
收藏
页码:81 / 94
页数:14
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