Centrality and power in social networks:: a game theoretic approach

被引：138

作者：

Gómez, D

González-Arangüena, E

Manuel, C

Owen, G

del Pozo, M

Tejada, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Complutense Madrid, Fac Matemat CC, Dept Estadist & IO 1, E-28040 Madrid, Spain

[2] USN, Postgrad Sch, Dept Math, Monterey, CA 93943 USA

[3] Univ Complutense Madrid, Fac Matemat CC, Dept Estadist & IO 3, E-28040 Madrid, Spain

来源：

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 2003年 / 46卷 / 01期

关键词：

social networks; game theory; centrality; shapley value;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00028-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A new family of centrality measures, based on game theoretical concepts, is proposed for social networks. To reflect the interests that motivate the interactions among individuals in a network, a cooperative game in characteristic function form is considered. From the graph and the game, the graph-restricted game is obtained. Shapley value in a game is considered as actor's power. The difference between actor's power in the new game and his/her power in the original one is proposed as a centrality measure. Conditions are given to reach some desirable properties. Finally, a decomposition is proposed. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：27 / 54

页数：28

共 19 条

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[2]

Bavelas A, 1948, APPL ANTHROPOL, V7, pA16

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