The IAEA conducts nuclear safeguards world-wide to verify countries' compliance with international agreements such as the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). For the past 25 years, the traditional safeguards tools of materials accountancy, containment and surveillance were focused on the declared nuclear materials in a country's fuel cycle. Following events in Iraq in 1991 and elsewhere, the IAEA initiated 'Programme 93+2' with the goals of strengthening the safeguards system, making it more cost-efficient and providing an enhanced ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities in States subscribing to comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreements. Environmental sampling and analysis are one important new feature introduced to aid in the detection of undeclared nuclear activities. This paper will describe the rationale behind this programme, the sampling and analytical methodology used, and the relevant quality assurance measures. The IAEA's Class-100 Clean Laboratory in Seibersdorf will be described along with the highly sensitive analytical techniques which will be employed there to determine the uranium and plutonium content and isotopic composition in environmental swipe samples collected during routine safeguards inspections. The analytical contribution of a Network of Analytical Laboratories in the Member States will also be described. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.
