A note on market power in an emission permits market with banking

被引：30

作者：

Liski, M

Montero, JP

机构：

[1] Helsinki Sch Econ, Dept Econ, Helsinki, Finland

[2] Catholic Univ Chile, Dept Econ, Santiago, Chile

来源：

ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS | 2005年 / 31卷 / 02期

关键词：

banking; market power; pollution permit;

D O I：

10.1007/s10640-005-1769-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper, we investigate the effect of market power on equilibrium path of an emission permits market in which firms can bank current permits for use in later periods. In particular, we study the market equilibrium for a large (potentially dominant) firm and competitive fringe with rational expectations. We characterize the equilibrium solution for different permits allocations and discuss the large firm's stock-holding constraints needed for credible market manipulation.

引用

页码：159 / 173

页数：15

共 15 条

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Cronshaw MB, 1996, J REGUL ECON, V9, P179

[2]

Ellerman A.D., 2000, Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program

[3]

ELLERMAN AD, 2002, TEMPORAL EFFICIENCY

[4] DOMINANT FIRM PRICING POLICY IN A MARKET FOR AN EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCE [J].