The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences

被引:732
作者
Bisin, A
Verdier, T
机构
[1] NYU, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10003 USA
[2] ENS, DELTA Paris, F-75014 Paris, France
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeth.2000.2678
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper studies the population dynamics of preference traits in a model of intergenerational cultural transmission. Parents socialize and transmit their preferences to their offspring, motivated by a form of paternalistic altruism ("imperfect empathy"). In such a setting we study the long run stationary state pattern of preferences in the population. according to carious socialization mechanisms and institutions. and identify sufficient conditions for the global stability of an heterogenous stationary distribution of the preference traits. We show that cultural transmission mechanisms have very different implications than evolutionary selection mechanisms with respect to the dynamics of the distribution of the traits in the population, and we study mechanisms which interact evolutionary; selection and cultural transmission. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:298 / 319
页数:22
相关论文
共 33 条
  • [1] ALNAJJAR N, 1995, ECONOMETRICA, V63, P119
  • [2] [Anonymous], ACCOUNTING TASTE
  • [3] BANDURA A, 1965, SOCIAL LEARNING PERS
  • [4] BAUMRIND D, 1967, GENET PSYCHOL MONOGR, V75, P43
  • [5] BECKER G, 1970, J ECON LIT, V14, P817
  • [6] BECKER G, 1993, Q J ECON, V3, P729
  • [7] BERGSTROM TC, 1995, AM ECON REV, V85, P58
  • [8] Is altruism evolutionarily stable?
    Bester, H
    Guth, W
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 1998, 34 (02) : 193 - 209
  • [9] BISIN A, 1999, AGENTS IMPERFECT EMP
  • [10] BISIN A, IN PRESS Q J EC