Model of transfer tax on transboundary water pollution in China's river basin

被引：41

作者：

Zhao, Laijun ^{[1
]}

Qian, Ying ^{[1
]}

Huang, Rongbing ^{[2
]}

Li, Changmin ^{[1
]}

Xue, Jian ^{[1
]}

Hu, Yue ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Shanghai Univ, Sch Management, Shanghai 200444, Peoples R China

[2] York Univ, Sch Adm Studies, Toronto, ON M3J 2R7, Canada

来源：

OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | 2012年 / 40卷 / 03期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Transboundary water pollution; River basin; Pollutant reduction cost; Transfer tax; Game model;

D O I：

10.1016/j.orl.2012.01.011

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

Transboundary water pollution is a persistent problem in China. This study proposes a Model of Transfer Tax (MTT) which incorporates a typical Stackelberg game between the administrator and individual region of a river basin. The MMT model considers the geographic structure of a river basin and can be used to compute an optimal pollutant transfer tax rate. Given the tax rate, an individual region can decide its optimal pollution reduction. The transfer tax rate serves as an ecological compensation standard that enhances cooperation on pollution reduction among the regions, achieving the minimum pollution reduction cost for the whole river basin. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：218 / 222

页数：5

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