Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games

被引：36

作者：

Hofbauer, J

Sorger, G

机构：

[1] Univ Vienna, Dept Math, A-1090 Vienna, Austria

[2] Univ Vienna, Dept Econ, A-1210 Vienna, Austria

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1999年 / 85卷 / 01期

基金：

奥地利科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.1998.2485

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The equilibrium selection approach of Matsui and Matsuyama (J. Econ. Theory 65 (1995), 415-434) which is based on rational players who maximize their discounted future payoff, is analyzed for symmetric two-player games with a potential function. It is shown that the maximizer of the potential function is the unique state that is absorbing and globally accessible for small discount rates. (C) 1999 Academic Press.

引用

页码：1 / 23

页数：23

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