Principal Costs in Initial Public Offerings

被引:17
作者
Dalziel, Thomas [1 ]
White, Robert E.
Arthurs, Jonathan D.
机构
[1] Univ Cincinnati, Dept Management, Coll Business, Cincinnati, OH 45221 USA
关键词
MULTIPLE-AGENCY CONFLICTS; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; ENTREPRENEURIAL IPOS; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; FIRMS; PERFORMANCE; VENTURES;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.01005.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The initial public offering (IPO) of a new venture's stock often results in significant changes to the firm's ownership structure. Because firm owners (principals) often have heterogeneous interests, conflicts can arise among the principals. While governance mechanisms are often effective in limiting agency problems, we suggest that principals can also attempt to use governance mechanisms to their own advantage in IPO settings. Specifically, when principal-principal conflict exists, powerful principals may exert control via governance mechanisms to pursue their own interests in ways that create inefficiencies in the form of 'principal costs'.
引用
收藏
页码:1346 / 1364
页数:19
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